January 16, 2019

Hotels: A market-sizing exercise

The hotel market in Vietnam is going through a phase of exuberance, but for good reason. There were 15.5 million visitors to the country in 2018, doubling the number from just 3 years ago.

It took Thailand 25 years to get from six million to 15 million arrivals. Vietnam? Only seven years, said [Kenneth] Atkinson [executive chairman of Grant Thornton Vietnam].

Source: Thai Tourism Website

Source: Thai Tourism Website

And the country wants many more tourists. It has a target of 20 million in 2020. That would represent 13.6% compound annual growth rate (CAGR).

All of these visitors will need hotel rooms, and there is a lot of building activity to accommodate them. According to STR, Vietnam has 781 hotels with 93,261 rooms currently and 124 hotels with 38,683 rooms in the pipeline.

There are a few questions that I thought were important to answer:

First, how long is this growth of tourists going to last? Second, is this too much supply in the short term (2020)? Long term, how much supply will there need to be? How much is it going to cost to build all these hotels? And what could be the potential return at different times and for different hotels?

Let’s take it step by step.

Can Vietnam reach 20 million visitors by 2020?

An Aggressive scenario: Tourists reach 35m in 2025 - prepresenting 12% growth; Source: Vietnamese Government, vietecon.com estimates

An Aggressive scenario: Tourists reach 35m in 2025 - prepresenting 12% growth; Source: Vietnamese Government, vietecon.com estimates

A conservative scenario: Tourists reach 30m in 2025 - representing 10% growth Source: Vietnamese Government, VietECon.Com Estimates

A conservative scenario: Tourists reach 30m in 2025 - representing 10% growth Source: Vietnamese Government, VietECon.Com Estimates

The first question is to ask how many visitors will Vietnam have in 2020 and 2025. We know the government is expecting 20 million, but that is a pretty fast growth rate (13.6% for two consecutive years). Looking at historical growth rates, 13.6% is actually somewhat low. From 2010 to 2018, foreign tourists grew 15.4% annually. Looking at Thailand, which is a good comparison, it took 7 years to get to 15m but then only 2 more to get to 22m. Visitors reached bit over 35m in 2017 and were on trend to exceed that in 2018 (28.5m visited in the first 9 months of 2019).

So, it appears that making it to 20 million by 2020 is very doable. Especially since strong economic growth should drive business visitors as well.

But what about 2025?

But now to the question of 2025. It is much harder to say what will happen through 2025. The government is committed to bringing in more tourists. It wants the investment (there is a lot of foreign investment in the tourism sector), plus it is a big job creator, and much of it isn’t so skilled. Because of all of this, government support should be there.

Then if we look at Thailand again, the country did 12% annual growth from 2010 to 2017, growing from 16m visitors to 35m. At this point, it seems like we could take 2 different data points and look at the impact of either of them. The first would be that foreign tourists would grow from 15m in 2018 to 30m in 2025, representing a 10% CAGR. The higher estimate of 35m would represent an 11.8% growth rate.

As a check, I also looked at the potential flights available (I did a blog piece about airplane capacity, scroll down to see it). It seems pretty clear that if the airlines add as much capacity as they have said they will, there will be plenty of seats. And we think something like 100m passengers is doable by 2025, which would include just a portion of these international visitors (not all of which come by plane). Plus, the government is targeting 13% annual growth into 2030 to reach 280m passengers. There would be plenty of space if we do reach 35m international visitors in 2025.

So tomorrow, we will build off these figures to see how many hotels the countries can handle.


January 15, 2019

CPTPP is here!!!

The big news for the past few days (years?) was the CPTPP coming into effect in Vietnam (14 days after the other ratifiers). Anyone following Vietnam knows that The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (easily abbreviated into the tongue-twister CPTPP) is a big trade agreement between a bunch of mid-sized countries that hug the Pacific (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam). Only 7 countries have ratified it so far, mainly the more developed ones. President Obama wanted this to be his signature Asian trade deal, but it didn’t happen in time and then President Trump cancelled it.

The Vietnamese are very excited, of course.

According to calculations by the National Centre for Socio-Economic Information and Forecasting under the Ministry of Planning and Investment, the CPTPP would boost Việt Nam’s GDP by US$1.7 billion and exports by more than $4 billion by 2035, up 1.32 per cent and 4.04 per cent respectively.

So this is big news for the country. A couple of points:

  • Some of the countries are scared that Vietnam’s low labor costs (which are not as low as we had suspected - we discussed this in our first post on Jan. 2, 2019, scroll way down to read it) will allow Vietnamese companies to eat their lunch. Malaysia, which has not ratified the treaty, probably has some big problems. Other ASEAN countries may also get left behind.

  • The US, in my opinion, totally missed the boat on this. There are already concerns about US wheat exports, because both Australia and Canada will now more easily export to Japan (which imports 5m tons of wheat a year equating to $1.5bn in 2017). Japan was the #2 destination for US wheat in 2018. There are going to be lots of other products like this. Trump has said that he would like to sign an agreement if he can get better terms, but that seems unlikely at this time.

  • We could see investments in Vietnam in order to improve company’s exports to these countries, especially if they are from a country subject to high tariffs. China, which already invests a lot in Vietnam, will likely take advantage of this where possible.

Vietnam probably needs to education its businesses on how better market their exports in these countries, especially as they try to increase the value add, or it will be stuck exporting raw materials or adding just enough value for foreign companies to meet the local content rules.

Crab news!!!

Another piece of news that I found very exciting was this: Crabs caught in UK picked in Vietnam due to staff shortage

Basically, with Brexit, there aren’t enough local workers to pick through cooked crab. So the crab company will cook the crab then freeze it and send it to Vietnam where they will pick it and send it back. So you could be eating “local” crab that has made a 20,000 journey! Take that locavores.


January 14, 2019

Vietnam and Enron

I am just now reading The Smartest Guys in the Room, a book about Enron and the reason’s for its fall. It is amazing how much stupidity, venality and hubris there was in the company. The book is a portrait of a place with money as its only North Star. I am sure at points employees and management believed that they were changing the world for the better (the initial deregulation of the natural gas market could be seen that way), but mostly, especially in later years, it was about making as much money as possible. And money to individuals not to the company or shareholders, which led to some real criminality, as evidenced by the numerous convictions of management. On the other hand, I was a bit surprised how many people got out of Enron and into good jobs without any issues.

The book is great, although sometimes reading about all the bad behavior becomes a slog.

One thing that caught my eye was that Enron International tried to make power deals all over the world, including Vietnam. In 1997, Enron announced that it is in the final stages of negotiations on several projects in Vietnam worth up to $3 billion. Two, at least, were still in the works in 2000. The first was a direct reduced iron (DRI) plant with a few partners. DRI is an input into steel making, and it must have been part of Enron’s push into metals trading (the company liked to buy real assets in order to have better information to push to trading). The second was a 675MW gas-fired power plant in Soc Trang to take advantage of some associated gas that was being burned off.

No surprise, Enron actively lobbied for government support. Even though most of management were basically libertarians with strong beliefs in the moral and economic righteousness of free markets. Everything should be deregulated, in their view. Yet, both of these projects “could only be done” with support of the US government. In fact, Enron lobbied the government to lift some provisions barrings US agency assistance to projects in Vietnam. Shortly thereafter, these provisions were lifted and the US Trade Development Authority provided almost $1m for preliminary studies for these projects. And I have no doubt that Enron would go back to the till for more money as the projects advanced.

Anyway, neither was built. The consortium building the DRI plant found another partner in 2000 (and I don’t know why - there’s nothing that I could find online). Even then, it was never built. The gas plant was also not built, and board meeting notes from late 2000 mention that “Vietnam issues [were] resolved with minimum impact to bottom line.” There have been a number of power plants built in Soc Trang since then, but it’s hard to tell if any of these were Enron’s specific plant.

Industry articles from the period do say that all big foreign investment projects had problems getting built, partly because of difficulties negotiating with the government. The biggest holdup was price of tariffs. Right now, from what I understand, the guaranteed tariffs are actually pretty good in Vietnam (around 15 cents per kwh). But there are uncertainties over that figure, because it expires soon and needs to be renewed. Investors continue to make investments, though, so let’s hope they don’t get burned.


January 11, 2019

Telecom news

Korea and China dominate the vietnamese mobile market Source; Counterpoint Research: Quarterly Market Monitor Q2 2018

Korea and China dominate the vietnamese mobile market Source; Counterpoint Research: Quarterly Market Monitor Q2 2018

Some small news on the telecom front.

eSim Coming to Vietnam: Vietnam’s top three mobile phone operators are implementing eSim. These are electronic SIMs (or the way that the carrier identifies the phone and allows it to use the network). With eSims, you wouldn’t need a physical SIM card, and you could have multiple carrier agreements and switch between then easily. Google (maker of Android) and Apple both support this, at least for some of their phones. Some carriers also support it, including the three major players in Vietnam. It looks like this will happen fairly soon.

5G Coming to Vietnam: The second piece of news is that Vietnam will start testing 5G in 2019, and it should be implemented over the next two years. Again, this depends on carrier investments and if your phone supports it. Xiaomi supports it with one phone already, Samsung will support it in some phones coming out this year, according to news reports. Samsung, Oppo and Xiaomi all are developing 5G phones to launch in 2019 (not sure yet if these will be sold in Vietnam, but I assume so). Apple may take a bit longer. Right now those first three represent about 64% of sales in Vietnam, and Apple just 5%.

Both of these will require some investing from the telecom operators. Obviously much more for 5G. And both of these advancements will help advance the internet of things. For eSim, that means that smaller devices can have a SIM now and connect to networks. We saw this with the Apple Watch. And the faster speeds from 5G should help drive innovation - now people will be able to move large amounts of data quickly and inexpensively. If you think of the whole arc of telecommunications and the internet as being cheaper and faster data transfer, then we should expect some very interesting innovations.

At this point, developing country mobile phone markets like Vietnam are basically no different (in terms of technological advancement) than developed markets, especially the US, which is slow and overpriced.


Januar 10, 2019

Great expectations

No big ideas today, just some things that caught my eye in the news today:

2019 forecasts for vn index

2019 forecasts for vn index

Stock analysts are looking for the market to rise to 1,049, which represents a 17.5% increase year-over-year. A few comments:

  • These forecasts are rarely right. Last year, analysts looked for a 23% rise but the market actually fell 9%.

  • The range of estimates goes from 1,000 to 1,115 (12% to 25% increase, respectively), so there is a wide range of responses.

  • Notably, none of the estimates are for a decline, but there rarely is.

  • This is no knock against analyst in Vietnam. S&P 500 forecasts are historically just as bad. Since 2005, on there was no forecasts for the market to decline (at least based on an average forecast, some individual analysts did, I am sure).

  • The forecast for 2019 for the S&P 500 is about the same (18%), at least among analysts that revised their forecasts as of January 6 (see this article, sub required).

  • Funnily enough, both the S&P 500 and the VN Index are trading at about 14x, so neither are especially expensive. And if we were to include growth in this. The PEG for the S&P 500 is 1.9x. Vietnam’s economic growth should be close to 7%, and it is very likely that earnings growth will be higher than that, based on historical trends. If we say 10% growth is possible, then the PEG is only 1.4x, much lower than the S&P 500.

S&P 500 forecasts have historically been wrong; Source: Marketwatch

S&P 500 forecasts have historically been wrong; Source: Marketwatch

We will have to see what actually happens with the market. So much will depend on international volatility. If there is a pull back in developed markets, we will likely see investors pull out of markets, starting with the riskier frontier markets (like Vietnam) first. This is something that I saw lots in the Middle East. Frontier markets do extremely well in long bull markets when investors get comfortable with the markets and start to look for yields further and further afield. But any scare makes them pull back from these markets first.

But, Asia is hot right now, and Vietnam benefits from the US trade war with China, so maybe it will hold up better than I expect.


January 9, 2019

Coconut oil and fad diets

Coconut oil prices way down Source: Foreign agricultural service/usda

Coconut oil prices way down Source: Foreign agricultural service/usda

Today I was going to write about coconut oil and the problems fad diets pose for farmers in countries like Vietnam that depend on exporting food products. It was based on this WSJ article (subscription required). The gist is that a few years ago, there were tons of food articles saying that coconut oil would help you lose weight (an example from late 2012 can be found here).

But then in July 2018 a Harvard professor called coconut oil “pure poison”. And there have been dozens of articles that talk about the health dangers of eating too much coconut oil (here’s one from the New York Times).

So I thought I would talk about how fad-ish diets can cause farmers to plant more of a certain type of vegetable or other product. If after all that planting is done and the supply is too great or the fad is not longer in fashion, you can see a sharp decline in prices and consumption.

And coconut oil prices are way down (-48% over the past year), bad for a country like Vietnam that produces a lot of coconuts (720m according to a story back in 2011). One province alone (Ben Tre) farms 600m alone, for sales of VND5.4 trillion (USD235m at current exchange rates). To put this in context, total exports of agricultural products were almost USD30bn in 2017, so coconuts are probably a just about 1% of the total. And I don’t really see any data that shows a big increase in production in Vietnam (and the data really isn’t there).

Production and consumption have moved only slightly around their average; Source: Foreign agricultural service/usda Years end in September

Production and consumption have moved only slightly around their average; Source: Foreign agricultural service/usda Years end in September

If we look at data from the Foreign Agricultural Service of the USDA, world production is just barely above average, and industrial and food consumption of the oil has barely changed over the past 10 years. I would have expected a spike. And during the period where I thought it would be highest (2012-2018), it’s actually fallen.

Now a small disconnect between supply and demand can result in big swings in commodity prices (we see that in crude oil sometimes). Maybe that undersupply and expectations of greater undersupply given the fad diets drove the prices up. An article from August 2017 (here) says there will soon be a massive shortage, presumably in early 2018.

One story that explains the price volatility is this: last year people were expecting much more demand than supply, so prices rose from an average of $1175 per metric ton in 2017 to a high of $1,485 in October 2018. Then actual production starts to come through about 5% up from the year before and the end of year stock actually doubles. Everyone had been expecting a coconut crunch, but what they got was plenty of inventory and moderate demand. Add to that, commodity prices had a horrible 2018, so that might have driven coconut prices even lower. Prices are now the lowest they have been since 2008/9 in the depths of the global financial crisis.

What I take away from all of this is that even when I see a trend so clearly (that fad diets would drive up demand for coconut in the short term but that it would soon die off, like all fad diets), it is very difficult to forecast what that will mean for underlying market prices. Especially when it is something with multiple uses and is globally traded.

The Vietnamese farmers are going to suffer from lower coconut oil prices, but there is a real chance for them to upgrade their production of oil and move up the value chain. That could really help profits at the individual level. Now, of course, it’s hard to come up with capital when your profits have been decimated, but maybe we will see more investment in the sector from companies that benefited from the higher prices, like we did in November 2018 when a local company invested in a new processing plant (read about it here).


January 8, 2019

A closer look at future airline capacity in Vietnam (part 2)

Growth has been very fast, but how much longer Source: CAPa

Growth has been very fast, but how much longer Source: CAPa

Continuing from yesterday, I wanted to dive deeper into the potential capacity of the Vietnamese market. I will do that in a few steps. First, the potential for the market as a whole. Second, the airlines capacity and potential capacity. Then third, what the impact of new planes will be. The domestic Vietnamese market was almost 36 million passengers in 2018. That is up from 31.6 million in 2017. It is a duopoly with Vietjet holding a 45% share in 1H2018, Vietnam Airlines at 38%, JetStar Pacific at 15% and Wasco with the rest.

First, let’s estimate the potential of the market.

thailand’s experience makes us doubt that vietnam will reach more than 200m pax a year Source: World Bank, World atlas

thailand’s experience makes us doubt that vietnam will reach more than 200m pax a year Source: World Bank, World atlas

Growth has been quite fast, with a CAGR from 2011 to 2018 of 17.0%. International passenger growth has been even faster at 18.2%. The Vietnamese aviation administration expects the growth to continue at high levels – 13% annual growth into 2030 to reach 280m passengers. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is more conservative, looking for just 4% annual growth to 2035 reaching 150 million passengers. The IATA forecast seems more reasonable to me – by 2035, most forecasts have the population rising to something like 110m. At 150m, that would mean that passengers are about 36% more than the population, or about the same ratio as we saw in Turkey in 2017 (108m passengers for a population of 81m). And just looking at absolute passenger figures, right now only the US and China (both richer and with larger populations) have more than 200m passengers at 849m and 551m, respectively. In fact, the UK and Ireland are the next largest at 150m each, and both are big hubs.

But what really makes us think this is unlikely is that Thailand has nowhere near that many airline passengers. According to the World Bank, it had only 71m passengers for a population of 69m and 35m international visitors. The international visitors are more than 2x Vietnam, and the country is also richer than Vietnam (2.4x richer on a nominal 2016 GDP level). So that makes it unlikely that the country will reach more than 200m passengers, or even the 150m IATA is anticipating.

But, even if we take the 150m as the 2030 figure, and assume that growth is heavily front-loaded, by 2025 we could see total passengers carried at 100m, likely equally divided between domestic and international. If each plane in the domestic market carries an average of 400,000 passengers a year, we would need 125 planes. The same for the international market.

capacity additions likely too aggressive Source: Vietecon, company websites

capacity additions likely too aggressive Source: Vietecon, company websites

What would 125 planes in the domestic market mean for capacity?

VietJet currently has 63 planes but an order for 179 more, Bamboo wants to have around 45 planes or so, and AirAsia wants to expand to 30. Vietnam Airlines has a fleet of 87 with orders for another 28 [check – this is from Wikipedia]. It looks like Jetstar Pacific only has 8 planes in Vietnam, but I am going to assume they add 10 more (as a reasonable guess). That means if all orders went through, there would be 450 planes, which on average would have a passenger capacity of c450,000 a year. That would equate to 202m passengers a year, quite a number and well above the 100m passengers we see by 2025.

What conclusions can we draw?

First, the companies will likely have not be able to make all the orders that they want. This is especially true for VietJet, which has an enormous order book.

Second, it is very likely that there will be a price war in the next few years. I probably didn’t have to do the math to reach that conclusion, but having done the math, airlines will take any hiccup in passenger growth as a call to lower prices and attract more riders.

Third, lower prices will be very bad for profits. AirAsia is already losing money in most of its markets, and VietJet, while making money, has higher unit costs ($0.24 excluding jet fuel) than AirAsia ($0.19 as of 3Q2018).

In his 2007 Chairman’s letter, Warren Buffett wrote:

The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.

Buffett famously changed his tune in 2017 by investing up to $10m in US carriers, mainly because he felt they were now more disciplined and only adding capacity justified by demand. Based on the current order book, I believe we could be looking at incipient overcapacity by the Vietnamese airlines (including AirAsia), despite the fast growth in passengers. If the companies order airlines as aggressively as they have publicized, we could very soon see overcapacity in the market. That would be good for passengers, but bad for the airlines’ profitability.

Update (Jan. 9, 2019): Bamboo Airlines announced that they have received their license from the Vietnamese government. You can read about it here.


January 7, 2019

A closer look at future airline capacity in Vietnam (part 1)

Capacity is much less than developed markets and even some of Vietnam’s neighbors

Capacity is much less than developed markets and even some of Vietnam’s neighbors

Lots of stories out over the past few weeks about AirAsia joining a local partner to bring the airline to Vietnam’s domestic market. It already flies in and out of 5 cities to international destinations (mainly their hubs in KL and Singapore), but it has long seen the domestic market as quite attractive. And it is! Total foreign tourist arrivals grew 20% last year and 29% the year before. Airline passenger numbers grew 12.9% in 2018. And the market is underserved compared to developed countries or even Thailand, based on LCC seats per thousand people or aircraft per million as can be seen in this chart.

What I wanted to look at was potential overcapacity in the domestic market and how many additional aircraft the market can support. Right now, AirAsia says it will have 5-6 A320 and A321 aircraft at the start and grow to as many as 30 in three years.

Just a quick and dirty test is to look at Vietjet and see how many passengers each of their aircraft serve. They serve about 375,000 passengers per plane with about 1/3rd A320s (180 passengers) and 2/3rds A321 (230 passengers). If AirAsia has the same ratio (1:2) and each aircraft carried about 400,000 passengers a year, it would serve 2.0 to 2.4m passengers. This would be just around 3%* of the total market share in Vietnam. For domestic operations, it would represent 6-7%* of the estimated market, well below Vietjet’s market share of 45%. Plus, there is growth in the market. Maybe not as much as 10%, but still growth.

My conclusion is that the initial 5-6 planes would likely be easily absorbed by the market.

But if it was 30 planes in 3 years, that would be 12 million passengers, or 11% of the total market and almost half of the domestic market. That would be much harder to absorb, and we would likely see massive discounting to drive passenger growth.

Look ahead for part 2 where I examine the market as a whole, and potential capacity. Vietjet has 100 737s (230 pax each) on order with Boeing, and Bamboo wants to have more than 40 planes servicing the domestic market. We could easily see more than 200 planes added to the market in the next three years. Is that a guarantee of oversupply?

* These figures were updated on Jan 8, 2019 to reflect better domestic and international passenger figures. Previously I used a figure given by the government that used all departing/arriving passengers, but this appears to double count domestic passengers. The figures used here now use CAPA figures.


January 4, 2019

Is the stock market efficient in Vietnam? On a preliminary basis, yes.

I generally have a view that the efficient market hypothesis is correct, at least in its weak form. This basically means that most stock prices are random and that it is very difficult if not impossible to predict how they will move. But of course, the whole active management fund industry is built in opposition to this.

As a corollary to my belief, I also think that developed markets (the US, most of the European exchanges) are more efficient than stock markets in developing countries and these more efficient than frontier markets. Literature on the subject seems to support this view, but it is also based on my experience living in the Middle East for 10 years working as an equity analyst, although maybe I am just talking my book. As Upton Sinclair wrote: “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it!”

Anyway, I was interested to read a recent paper about the Ghana stock market. From the abstract:

The random walk hypothesis (RWH) was tested using four robust statistical tests, namely the Ljung-Box autocorrelation test, unit root tests, the runs test, and variance ratio tests (such as Wright’s rank and sign and Lo-Mac Kinlay). The empirical results showed that all four tests rejected the random walk hypothesis required by the weak-form efficient market hypothesis in all four return series. This provides empirical basis to infer that the GSE is inefficient at weak-form.

There have been multiple similar papers for other countries that show similar results, mostly in emerging markets, including for Vietnam, but mostly ending in 2013. I thought it would be interesting to try the same for the Vietnam stock exchange using the past five years of trading and see if it is “inefficient”. I didn’t have the time to run all of the statistical tests, so I did a quick and dirty regression of a few things to see if it was worth it to follow up.

An efficient market is one in which “successive price changes in individual securities must be independent.” I decided an easy test would be to look at successive prices (n, n+1) to see if there was any statistically significant explanation between the two. Basically, if a stock price is up on day 1, does that mean it would also rise on day 2. The way to test that is to run a Durbin-Watson test to see if “errors” are correlated. Basically, do a regression, find out what the fits the line and then find the errors for each of the points in the series. Then take those errors and see if one is correlated to the next. I did this for three different securities: the index (VNI), the largest cap stock (VIC) and a stock with a smaller capitalization but good volume compared to other small stocks (FLC).

P values Mostly not significant, r squared is small and Durbin-watson test shows no autocorrelation

P values Mostly not significant, r squared is small and Durbin-watson test shows no autocorrelation

I was surprised to find that the regression showed that the successive price changes were independent. For both VN and VIC, the R squareds were minimal and the p-values were way out of significance range. The Durbin-Watson test showed the same - the results were clustered around 2, which means there is little autocorrelation.

I was somewhat surprised by the p-value for FLC, which was much lower than the others, meaning that the finding is significant at the 10% probability range. I ran these as the natural log of the change in price (ln(p+1/p). If I had run it as just as the percentage change ((p+1/p)-1) the p-value would have been just under 0.05, or significant at the 5% level.

The conclusion I take from the more significant p-value for FLC is that maybe smaller cap stocks are less efficient. Investment managers might be able to drive investment decisions on that basis, if the volume is there. The problem, though, is that for many even medium-sized funds, a stock that has a market cap of just USD161m may be difficult to invest in. Say you had a fund of USD200m to invest in Vietnam and wanted to take 20 positions with an average of USD10m, then you would own 6.2% of FLC. Even with solid volume, it would probably be hard to get in and out in a quick fashion.

Back to the market efficiency, I think it would make sense to run more of these tests - there are four that people usually run. We might find some cases where the market isn’t efficient that could help result in investment decision.


January 2, 2019

Labor costs in Vietnam higher than I expected

The World Bank had an interesting report out on SMEs in Vietnam. While it is interesting throughout, what caught my eye was that labor costs in Vietnam are actually higher than in its south east Asian neighbors:

The median Vietnamese firm reported that wages and salaries cost about $2,739 per worker—about twice as high as in Lao PDR, Myanmar and Malaysia, and about 30 to 45 percent higher than in Cambodia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Wage costs are, however, considerably lower than in the BRIC economies other than India.

The report says that the higher wages are actually tied to higher productivity in these other countries (based on unit labor costs, or the ratio of labor costs to value added) so that Vietnam remains competitive.

This raises a few thoughts:

First, I am surprised that Vietnamese labor costs are so much higher than its neighbors. We don’t see that in nominal GDP per capita. In fact, nominal GDP per capita (back in 2016) wasn’t that different than the labor cost mentioned in this report.

Per Capita GDP is just below the average labor costs

Per Capita GDP is just below the average labor costs

Second, there is a definite risk that Vietnam gets stuck in the middle in terms of labor costs. Meaning, their unskilled labor is too expensive, but they don’t have enough skilled labor to make up for it. The fact that total labor productivity is higher than neighboring countries means that “the median Vietnamese firm seems to be more productive than the median firms in any of the other comparator countries except for Laos.”

Third, no surprise but foreign firms are more productive. The rest of the report talks about how to link smaller Vietnamese firms to these more productive foreign firms in order to up the skills of the local companies. The report specifically talks about suppliers to the multinationals. This might be an interesting sector to get involved in. Basically, see what sector is bringing in the most FDI and then invest in suppliers to that sector. Writing out, obviously it isn’t rocket science…but maybe no one is being systematic about it.

Finally, women, as usual, have more difficulties than men. “While as many as or more linked firms are headed by a female manager in Vietnam compared to nonlinked firms in China, Malaysia and Thailand, it appears that Vietnamese women manager face additional difficulties to establish linkages.” A survey of female managers said the problem isn’t really capital but other things.

As someone who worked for years in the Middle East, this doesn’t seem that bad. But also means that maybe the extremely low-hanging fruit that I saw in Saudi of getting women to get any type of job is not available. There, just increasing the productivity of women by a tiny bit meant so much to disposable income, GDP, innovation, and so many other things.

The whole report can be downloaded here.